‘Dialectic’, in the modern sense (not Socratic), names an approach to thinking about differences as primarily oppositions. The opposition is resolved through synthesis which transcends the opposition. Typically, opposition is understood negatively: “A is opposed to B” is the same as
“A = not B” or A is the negation of B.
The appeal of this arises in two ways:
- A person (or party) finds oneself in a disturbing condition of opposition to something, and thinks of this dialectically, i.e., as a challenge of getting beyond the opposition through “synthesis” of some kind (“situated transcendence,” for example: ch. 7 here).
- One comes to a disturbing situation already thinking dialectically, so the disturbance is understood oppositionally (e.g., disagreement; or alienation which objectifies the other).
not even in the Socratic sense, which pertains to a conception of pedagogical debate.
The history of the notion (as textual legacy) begins with Socrates (i.e., Plato’s discursive character), but the notion evolves, and that evolution is beyond dialectical understanding.
The modern sense of ‘dialectic’ is pre-evolutionary (typically neo-Hegelian), while evolution is a modern, progressive notion, actually beyond the biological sense of natural-selective changes, which are not progressive, except inasmuch as a notion of intelligence (e.g., advancing complexity, advancing appreciability) is mapped into ecological conditions.
Though the modern notion of dialectics responds to the preceding modern interest in progress or social progressivity (and individual prosperity), typical of European modernity, the sense of progress is thereby made dialectical, not discerned as already dialectical. That is,
the conception of progress is conceived as dialectical.
But the conception of progress has evolved too, in a way which is historical in a non-dialectical sense, in terms of varyng notions of high culture across civilizations, then through the emergence of European modernity around the beginning of the second millennium CE.
So, the modern notion of dialectics is unwittingly immersed in an evolution of notions of pedagogy, progress, history, and evolving which the notion of dialectics (I would argue) cannot comprehend in its own terms, basically because differentiation in intelligent life isn’t basically oppositional.
For example, being male isn’t basically about not being female (though the anthropology of paternalism—paradigmatically religious; or “warranted” by classical religions—shows otherwise, pathogenically so). Being a child isn’t basically about not yet being an adult (though the anthropology of family shows otherwise, disciplinarily so). Disagreeing with you isn’t basically about opposing you (though common practice is otherwise, divisively so).
The “isn’t” there is differential, not oppositional, because in each kind of case the oppositional condition is ununwitting concealment of the real difference (a complexity which is beyond oppositional understanding), i.e., oppositioning is an unwitting degrading of the other—unwitting inasmuch as it’s an underdevelopment of one’s comprehension of difference, an immaturity of understanding the other.
Therefore, a conception of developmental difference aptly affirms the developmental relativity of opposition; and, I would argue, aptly frames the opposition as a developmental immaturity.
Of course, opposition is often required, but as a derivative, supplement-
ary, maybe extreme mode of taking exception to a situation: being drawn into a defensive stance toward an aggressive, regressed mode of adversarial relations that doesn’t allow peaceful resolution.
Because human life is developmental, i.e., lifeworldliness is intrinsically developmental, willful opposition (i.e., insistance on the validity of one’s opposition) is best regarded as an educational (or clinical) kind of issue, i.e., a framing which calls for more sophistication (or therapeutic efficacy) by the wlllfully opposed other.
So, dialectic thinking, relative to Our evolving (involving pedagogical, progressive, and historical sensibility) is a notion of evolving thought, which is individually developmental, thus culturally developmental or poltically developmental.
An articulable developmental-evolutionary relativity of conceptuality includes an evolution of dialectics which dissolves into the evolution of thinking about differences. Dialectical thinking (in the modern sense) is an evolutionarily immature era of thinking about individuation (education, pedagogy) and culture (progressivity, history). This is easily demonstrable in terms of the etymology of ‘dialectic’, which I’ll address later.
For now, I want to emphasize that the immaturity of understanding differences easily becomes pathological, e.g., in common instances of regarding a person’s criticism as the expressions of an enemy. Or one’s inability to understand the other makes the other an alien, as if diseased.
A stunning version of this is pathological narcissism, which accuses the adversarial other of dispositions which are actually one’s own. For example, Donald Trump “found” “hoaxes” all around him, but was deeply involved in deceiving (and thereby exploiting) others. Vladimir Putin sees NATO designing to colonize Russia, when actually Putin designs to colonize non-Russian slavic nations. He sees aspirations of empire by a “West” that actually mirrors his own desire to lead a Russian empire.
In the post-WW-I period, Carl Schmitt developed a “political theology” which understands the political world as composed of “friends” and “enemies”—and justified that in theological terms. Many German academics of the period found Schmitt very persuasive, and his work was popular in the university during the Nazi period.
In contemporary China, there is strong interest in Carl Schmitt’s thinking in relation to warranting the entitlement of neo-Maosist socialism in neo-Confucian terms which pretends to entail a calling for global greatness which must regard the U.S. so adversarially that the U.S. becomes an enemy (albeit one with which China depends for trade).
The “warrant” of autocracy needs to regard democracy as an enemy, while the warrant of democracy regards autocracy as a tragedy which deserves humane emancipation into the fair world—into the principle-based international order which evolved after WW-II.
A few days ago, I responded to an article by a well-known professor of public policy—a“leftie,” he calls himself—who severely misunderstands the historical unimportance of Putin’s regressed, deluded despotism toward Ukraine, where I concluded in part that:
A Dialectic of history is invalid: a depressive position, if not ultimately nihilistic. [The professor is extremely pessimistic, finding Putin’s invasion vastly corroborative of the professor’s pessimism about global democratic promise, which motivates his advice for oppositional activism within democratic societies.] Progress does not originate from transcending conflict. Good lives are not based on prevailing over trauma. The latter is the exception that proves the basis of our lives in potential we already always embodied.
Progress originates from keeping fidelity to the long arc of our evolving potential, which has indeed seen the triumph of
"the better angels of our nature" (Steven Pinker)—especially inasmuch as educators keep primacy of potential proven by healing adversity—and opinion leaders write to secure constructive thinking as the precursor and motive for critique, not constructiveness as a supplement, dependent on emergence of adversity to motivate progress.
History amply proves that aspiration for fair flourishing prevails over predatory power, notwithstanding the periods
of horror that we must make never again occur.
